| Detecting auctioneer corruption: Evidence from Russian procurement auctions P Andreyanov, A Davidson, V Korovkin Unpublished manuscript. https://editorialexpress. com/cgi-bin/conference …, 2017 | 41* | 2017 |
| Robust mechanism design of exchange P Andreyanov, T Sadzik The Review of Economic Studies 88 (2), 521-573, 2021 | 18 | 2021 |
| Mechanism choice in scoring auctions P Andreyanov Unpublished, 2018 | 9 | 2018 |
| Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers P Andreyanov, EH Caoui Quantitative Economics 13 (3), 1203-1256, 2022 | 8 | 2022 |
| Past performance and procurement outcomes P Andreyanov, F Decarolis, R Pacini, G Spagnolo Available at SSRN 4929595, 2024 | 7 | 2024 |
| Optimal Robust Double Auctions P Andreyanov, J Park, T Sadzik Technical report, Working paper, 2023 | 2 | 2023 |
| Nonparametric inference on counterfactuals in first-price auctions P Andreyanov, G Franguridi arXiv preprint arXiv:2106.13856, 2021 | 2 | 2021 |
| Optimal robust divisible mechanisms for public goods P Andreyanov, J Copic, B Jeong Working paper, 2018 | 2 | 2018 |
| Scoring and Favoritism in Optimal Procurement Design P Andreyanov, I Krasikov, A Suzdaltsev arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.12714, 2024 | 1 | 2024 |
| Essays on Prior-Free Mechanism Design P Andreyanov University of California, Los Angeles, 2019 | 1 | 2019 |
| Simple nonparametric inference for first-price auctions via bid spacings P Andreyanov, G Franguridi arXiv preprint arXiv:2106.13856, 2021 | | 2021 |
| XXI'st century media capture E Abramov, P Andreyanov | | 2018 |
Vasily KorovkinUniversitat Pompeu FabraVerified email at upf.edu
